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ABSTRACT
The stock market appreciates by an average of 60 percent in real dollar terms when countries
announce debt relief agreements under the Brady Plan. In contrast, there is no significant increase
in market value for a control group of countries that do not sign agreements. The results persist after
controlling for IMF agreements, trade liberalizations, capital account liberalizations, and
privatization programs. The stock market revaluations forecast higher future net resource transfers
and GDP growth. While markets respond favorably to debt relief in the Brady countries, there is no
evidence to suggest that current debt relief efforts for the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs)
will achieve similar results.
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I. Introduction 
Bono and Jesse Helms want debt relief for highly indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs).  The Pope and 17 million people are behind them.  On June 17, 1999, the lead 
singer of U2 presented 17 million signatures in support of the Jubilee 2000 Debt Relief 
Initiative to Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder at a meeting of G8 leaders in Cologne, 
Germany.  In a Papal Bull on November 29, 1998, Pope John Paul II called on wealthy 
nations to relieve the debts of developing nations in order to “remove the shadow of 
death.” 
Opponents of debt relief occupy less hallowed ground but are no less zealous 
about their cause, citing at least three reasons why the debt relief campaign is misguided.  
First, debt relief alone cannot solve the problem of third world debt.  Even if all debt 
were forgiven, it will accumulate again if income does not grow faster than expenditure 
(O’Neill, 2002).  Second, debt relief can create perverse incentives for debtor countries— 
by relaxing budget constraints, debt relief may induce governments into prolonging bad 
economic policies (Easterly, 2001a).  Third, rewriting debt contracts may hurt a debtor’s 
reputation and hinder its ability to obtain future loans (Easterly, 2001b). 
Moral proponents of debt relief can point to three counterarguments in their 
defense.  First, some debts are illegitimate.  There is a precedent for canceling debt that is 
odious— incurred without the consent of the people and not for their benefit— and 
Kremer and Jayachandran (2002) present a feasible way of doing so.  Second, debt relief 
can benefit both creditors and debtors (Krugman, 1988; Sachs, 1989).  Third, and related 
to the second point, it is good accounting practice to write off debts that cannot be   2
collected.  That way, future loans can be given on a sounder economic basis (Sachs and 
Huizinga, 1987; Summers, 2000). 
Does debt relief help or hurt the recipient?  This paper takes a new approach.  We 
ask the stock market to opine.  In March of 1989 the United States government formally 
approved an initiative by Treasury Secretary Nicolas Brady calling for debt relief for 
third world countries.  Between 1989 and 1995, sixteen developing countries reached 
debt relief agreements under the Brady plan.  This paper examines the response of each 
debtor country’s stock market to the news of its own Brady agreement.  Figure 1 conveys 
the central fact.  The stock market appreciates by an average of 60 percent in real dollar 
terms when countries announce the signing of a Brady debt relief agreement.   
The stock market is forward looking.  It asks what discount rates and cash flows 
lie ahead.  The effect of debt relief on discount rates and cash flows follows from the 
collective action problem that it is designed to solve.  If each creditor would agree to 
forgive some of its claims, then the debtor country would be better able to service the 
debt owed to each creditor.  Consequently, the expected value of all creditors’ claims 
would rise.  Forgiveness will not happen without coordination, however, because any 
individual creditor would prefer to free ride, maintaining the full value of its claims while 
others write off some debt (Krugman, 1988; Sachs, 1989).  By forcing all creditors to 
take a haircut, debt relief solves the collective action problem and paves the way for 
profitable new lending (Cline, 1995).  The new capital inflow reduces discount rates in 
the debtor country by relaxing the intertemporal budget constraint (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
1996).  Also, to the extent that a country suffers from debt overhang, debt relief increases   3
the incentive to invest and may raise expected future growth rates and cash flows 
(Krugman, 1989; Sachs, 1989).   
The stock market removes the temporal dimension of the analysis by collapsing 
the entire expected future stream of debtor-country discount rates and cash flows into a 
single summary statistic: the change in the value of the stock market.  However, it is 
important not to look at debtor-country stock market responses in isolation.  Suppose that 
the Brady Plan coincides with a global shock unrelated to debt relief that reduces 
discount rates and increases cash flows.  Debtor-country stock markets will rise, but so 
too will stock markets in countries that do not sign debt relief agreements. 
In order to assess whether the Brady country stock market boom was due to the 
announcement of debt relief agreements or a common shock, we compare the stock 
market response of the Brady countries with the market response of a similar group of 
countries that did not sign Brady deals.  Figure 1 shows that the control group does not 
experience a significant increase in stock prices; the market response in debtor countries 
cannot be explained by an unobservable common shock. 
Reporting the results in real dollar terms also requires caution.  In countries with 
high inflation, the rate of depreciation of the official nominal exchange rate may not keep 
pace with inflation.  Under such a scenario, the real dollar value of the stock market may 
become artificially inflated.  To account for this possibility, Section II analyzes the stock 
market using real local-currency stock returns.  The conclusions are unaltered.  The stock 
market responds in a positive and statistically significant manner to debt relief 
agreements, but there is no significant market response for the control group.   4
Many countries enter into IMF programs immediately following the 
announcement of their Brady Plan.  Therefore, it is possible that debt relief agreements 
drive up stock prices because they signal future IMF programs.  We investigate this 
possibility by examining whether stock markets respond positively to IMF agreements 
that are not accompanied by debt relief.  Section IV demonstrates that this is not the case. 
Similarly, countries receive Brady deals in return for committing to economic 
reforms that are designed to increase openness and raise productivity.  So, it is possible 
that stock prices go up because debt relief signals future reforms.  Again, this is not the 
case.  The market response to debt relief remains significant when controlling for 
concurrent reforms: trade liberalization, privatization, and capital account liberalization. 
After grappling with concerns about robustness in Section IV, Section V turns to 
issues of interpretation.  Why do stock prices rise?  Is this a spurious result?  Or, does the 
stock market rationally forecast future changes in future fundamentals?  Again, theory 
points to the net resource transfer (NRT) and future growth.  If market values rise 
because debt relief paves the way for profitable new lending, then the stock market 
responses should have some predictive power for future changes in the NRT.  Similarly, 
if debt relief improves future growth prospects, then the stock market responses should 
have some predictive power for future changes in output.  While this approach does not 
provide definitive evidence, the stock market responses do help predict the change in the 
NRT and GDP growth for up to five years following the agreements. 
Would debt relief for the HIPCs produce the salutary effects achieved by the 
Brady Plan?  We do not think so.  The Brady Plan worked because debt relief was the 
appropriate policy response for a group of countries where the collective action problem   5
genuinely stood in the way of profitable new lending.  In a companion paper, we 
demonstrate that the collective action problem is not the primary obstacle to growth in the 
HIPCs (Arslanalp and Henry 2002).  Rather, the principal obstacles are a lack of basic 
institutions and social infrastructure, problems that debt relief is unlikely to solve 
(Easterly 2001b) 
Debt relief has become synonymous with the HIPCs, but a number of middle-
income developing countries are also substantially indebted (Easterly 2001b; Birdsall and 
Williamson 2002).  Furthermore, Section VI of this paper shows that these middle-
income countries bear far greater resemblance to the Brady countries than do the highly 
indebted poor countries.  And yet the middle-income debtors are not part of the debt 
relief conversation.  In other words, our results point to a cruel irony.  The debt relief 
debate focuses myopically on the HIPCs, whose problems debt relief cannot solve, while 
countries that would actually benefit from debt relief receive precious little consideration. 
 
II.  Data and Descriptive Findings 
Table I provides a complete list of the countries in the treatment and control 
groups.  The treatment group consists of all countries that received a Brady Plan.  There 
are 16 such countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Jordan, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.  The table also gives the announcement date of each country’s 
Brady Plan.  The principal source of dates is Table 5.3 on page 234 of International Debt 
Reexamined (Cline, 1995).  However, the book does not provide announcement dates for   6
Bolivia, Nigeria, Panama, Peru and the Philippines
1.  For these five countries we 
retrieved announcement dates using the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe 
(http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe).
2  We verified the accuracy of the search by 
matching the dates obtained from Lexis-Nexis with those in the Quarterly Economic 
Reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).   
 
IIA.  Selection of the Control group 
The control group consists of all developing countries that: (1) Did not receive a 
Brady plan; and (2) Have stock market data in the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) Emerging Market Data Base going back to at least 1994.  There are 16 such 
countries: Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and 
Zimbabwe.   
Since the treatment group consists of countries whose stock markets respond to 
external shocks, it is crucial that the control group contains countries whose stock 
markets will also respond to such shocks.  If the control group consists of countries in 
such an abject state of development that their economies lack basic institutions, then their 
stock markets may not respond positively no matter how favorable the external shocks.  
In other words, it is important to ask whether the selection of the control group introduces 
statistical bias into our findings.  We address this concern by examining the 
characteristics of the two groups in some detail. 
                                                 
1 Cline (1995) provides only the year of the announcement for the Philippines and only the implementation 
date for Nigeria and Bolivia. It does not provide any dates for Panama and Peru because these countries 
were still negotiating their debt relief agreements at the time of the publication. 
2 A data appendix containing the complete list of articles that were uncovered by the Lexis Nexis search is 
available upon request.     7
The treatment group and the control group display similar geographical 
dispersion.  Both groups contain countries from Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Eastern 
Europe.  One significant difference is that Latin American countries comprise the largest 
fraction of countries in the treatment group.  The control group, however, consists mostly 
of Asian counties.  History suggests that the relatively heavier weighting of Asian 
countries in the control group will make that group the stronger economic performer.  We 
confirm this suspicion by comparing the treatment group and the control group using two 
standard measures of economic performance, growth and inflation.   
The control group outperforms the treatment group on both measures.  Table I 
shows that between 1980 and 1999 the median growth rate of per capita GDP for the 
control group was 3 percent.  The treatment group grew by only 1 percent per year during 
the same time period.  GDP growth was also less volatile in the control group.  The 
standard error of GDP growth for the control group was 1 percent, as compared to 2 
percent for the treatment group.  Finally, the control group has a lower and less volatile 
rate of inflation: a median of 11 percent and a standard deviation of 3 percent.  The 
corresponding numbers for the treatment group are 27 and 18.   
To summarize, the median country in the control group has faster and less volatile 
growth together with lower and less volatile inflation than its treatment group 
counterpart.  To the extent that superior long-run economic performance is positively 
correlated with better-managed economies, we would expect stock markets in the median 
control-group country to be more responsive to any auspicious common shock.  If there is 
any selection bias, it works against finding a significantly large revaluation in the Brady 
countries.  In other words, the bias, if any, strengthens our results.   8
IIB.  Stock Market Data 
The principal source of stock market data is the IFC’s Emerging Markets Data 
Base (EMDB)
3.  Stock price indices for individual countries are the dividend-inclusive, 
U.S. dollar-denominated and local currency-denominated IFC Global Indices.  For most 
countries, EMDB’s coverage begins in December 1975, but for others coverage only 
begins in December 1984.  Each country’s U.S. dollar-denominated stock price index is 
deflated by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI), which comes from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS).  The local currency-denominated index is deflated 
by the local consumer price index for each country, which is also obtained from the IFS.  
Returns and inflation are calculated as the first difference of the natural logarithm of the 
real stock price and CPI, respectively.  All of the data are monthly. 
Reliable stock market data exist for only 10 of the Brady countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Ecuador, Jordan, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, and Venezuela.  
We bring back Bolivia, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Panama, and 
Uruguay into the picture in Section V where we move the focus of analysis from 
financial to real data.  
 
IIC.  Descriptive Findings: Stock Market Responses to Debt Relief Announcements 
This subsection presents evidence on how the stock market responds to news of a 
future debt relief agreement.  For each country in the treatment group we calculate the 
average monthly stock return over the entire sample.  The average monthly return is a 
proxy for the expected monthly return.  Subtracting a country’s expected return from its 
actual return gives the abnormal return.  Now let month [0] be the month in which a 
                                                 
3 For Ecuador, the source of stock market data is the Global Financial Data Base.   9
Brady debt relief announcement takes place, for a given country.  Similarly, let [-12] 
denote the 12
th month before the debt relief announcement, so that [-12, 0] denotes the 
one-year window preceding the announcement.  The cumulative abnormal return for a 
country is defined as the sum of its abnormal returns from month –12 to month 0. 
Figure 1 plots the average cumulative abnormal return across all ten Brady 
countries in event time.  The average Brady country stock market experiences cumulative 
abnormal returns of 60 percent in real dollar terms.  In other words, the real dollar value 
of the stock market increases by 60 percent more than it does in a typical year.  Now look 
at the graph for the control group.  If a common shock caused the run-up in equity prices 
in the Brady countries, then we should see a run-up in the stock prices of the control 
group as well.  This is not the case.  The average cumulative abnormal return for the 
control group is close to 0.  The preliminary conclusion is that the stock price increase in 
the debtor countries is not due exclusively to a common shock that has favorable effects 
on all emerging stock markets.   
One concern is that the results may be sensitive to whether real returns are 
measured in dollars or local currency units.  To address this concern, Figure 2 replicates 
the graph using real local currency returns instead of real dollar returns.  Figure 2 is 
virtually identical to Figure 1.  Since the choice of currency makes little difference, the 
formal empirical analysis in Section III focuses on the dollar-denominated returns.   
Outliers are another source of potential concern.  Since there are only ten 
countries in the Brady stock market group, one country may dominate the results.  To 
explore this possibility we conduct median tests in the following way.  For each of the ten 
countries we compute the median annual stock return.  The stock return in the 12-month   10
period preceding the Brady announcement exceeds the median, annual return for every 
country except Peru.  We also conducted median tests in local currency and the results 
were the same.  Peru is the only country whose stock return during the 12-month 
announcement window was less than its median 12-month return. 
 
III.  Methodology and Formal Empirical Results 
We evaluate the statistical significance of the relationships apparent in Figure 1 
by estimating the following regression:  
12 it i it it it R BRADY CONTROL α γγ ε =+ + + .                                                                     (1) 
Where  it R  is the real return in dollars on country i’s stock market index in month t, 
it BRADY  is a dummy variable that is equal to one in [-12, 0].  CONTROL is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one in all of the control countries in Brady-Announcement 
months [-12, 0].  We also estimate BRADY and CONTROL using nine-month [-9, 0], 
six-month [-6, 0], and three-month [-3, 0] windows.  The country-specific intercepts 
allow for the possibility that average expected returns may differ across countries due to 
imperfect capital market integration.   
Equation (1) constrains the coefficients on BRADY to be the same across all 
months, which means that the parameter  1 γ  measures the average monthly stock market 
response to all Brady Plan Announcements.  Since the dummy variable for the event 
window is twelve months long, the total stock market response to debt relief for the 
Brady countries is given by twelve times the parameter estimate.   
A different estimation technique would be to use a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR).  This approach would have the advantage of providing a unique coefficient   11
estimate for each country for each event.  However, there are also disadvantages to this 
approach.  The low power of hypothesis tests in unconstrained systems severely weakens 
the ability of the event study methodology to detect the impact of the event.  Second, 
SUR requires a balanced panel.  Due to the limited time series availability of stock 
market data, creating a balanced panel would result in discarding some of the 10 debt 
relief events.  Given data limitations, the pooled cross-section time series framework 
seems appropriate.  
With an unbalanced panel, it is not possible to relax the assumption of no 
contemporaneous correlation of the error term across countries.  Therefore, we will take 
indirect precautions.  Specifically, three of the alternative regression specifications to 
equation (1) will estimate abnormal returns relative to the World stock market index, US 
stock market index, and finally IFC’s emerging stock market index.  Since all of the 
sample countries are emerging markets, the inclusion of a composite emerging market 
index as a right-hand-side variable will partially control for contemporaneously 
correlated disturbance terms.  Including the emerging market index does not change the 
results. 
 
IIIA. Basic Results 
The first row of Table II (Panel A)— labeled ‘Country-Specific Mean’— gives 
the results from the baseline specification in equation (1).  White standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  Column (1a) shows that the coefficient on BRADY for the 
twelve-month window [-12, 0] is 0.05 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Multiplying the coefficient by 12 gives the total effect, a 60-percent increase in the real   12
dollar value of the stock market.  Column (1b) gives the coefficient estimate for the 
CONTROL dummy.  In contrast to the estimate for the BRADY countries, the 
revaluation effect associated with the control group is economically weak, 0.005, and 
statistically insignificant.  Column (1c) provides the p-value from a two-sided F-test of 
the hypothesis that the coefficient estimate on BRADY is equal to the coefficient 
estimate on CONTROL.  The p-value for this test is 0.001.  The difference between the 
BRADY estimate and the CONTROL estimate is statistically significant.  In other words, 
the stock market in BRADY countries rises by roughly 60 percentage points more than it 
does in the CONTROL group.   
The results using nine-month, six-month, and three-month windows are all 
consistent with the 12-month estimates.  The coefficient estimate of BRADY ranges from 
0.048 to 0.052 and is statistically significant in every specification.  Furthermore, the 
BRADY estimate is always significantly larger than the estimate of CONTROL.  Row 2 
of Table II (Panel A)— labeled, ‘Constant Mean’— presents estimates of equation (1) 
using a constant intercept term, α , instead of country-specific intercept terms.  The 
results are almost identical to those in Row 1. 
 
IIIB. Controlling For World Stock Markets 
Equation (1) provides a parsimonious baseline specification of abnormal returns, 
but it does not allow for the influence of world stock markets on local returns.  In order to 
do so, we follow Kho, Lee and Stulz (2000) and use the international capital asset pricing 
model (ICAPM) to measure the expected return on each country’s stock market index.  
Specifically, we now estimate:   13
12
W
it i t it it R R BRADY CONTROL α βγ γ ε =+ + + + ,                                                            (2) 
Where 
W
t R  is the real return in dollars on the Morgan Stanley Capital Market Index 
(MSCI) in month t.  While barriers to the international movement of capital may raise 
questions about the economic assumption of an ICAPM, as a purely statistical matter, 
returns on world stock market indices do have some predictive power for stock returns in 
the countries under consideration (Henry 2000a).
4   
Row 3 of Table II (Panel A) presents estimates of BRADY and CONTROL using 
equation (2).  Row 4 presents estimates that use real U.S. stock returns, 
US
t R , in place of 
W
t R .  Row 5 presents estimates that use the real dollar return on the IFC Emerging 
Market index, 
LDC
t R , in place of 
W
t R .  Row 6 presents estimates that use all three sets of 
world stock returns simultaneously. The results in Rows 3 through 6 perfectly mirror 
those under the benchmark specification in Rows 1 and 2.  The coefficient on BRADY is 
statistically significant under all four ICAPM specifications.  The point estimate ranges 
from 4.9 to 3.9 percent per month, and the estimate of BRADY is significantly larger 
than the estimate of CONTROL in all but the three-month window estimates. 
 
IIIC.  Other Robustness Checks 
The estimates in Panel A of Table II adjust for cross-country heteroscedasticity 
and cross-country correlation, but they do not account for potential serial correlation in 
the error terms.  Hence, White standard errors may not be sufficient to ensure the 
                                                 
4 For conceptual discussions of the international capital asset pricing model see Frankel (1994); Stulz 
(1999a); Tesar (1999); Tesar and Werner (1995); and Tesar and Werner (1998).  For empirical evidence on 
the real effects of increased capital market integration, see Henry (2000b). 
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reliability of the estimates in Panel A.  To address this concern, Panel B of Table II re-
estimates all of the specifications in Panel A using Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS).  FGLS allows for the possibility of serial correlation, in addition to correcting 
for cross-country heteroscedasticity.   
The estimations using FGLS yield the same conclusions as the OLS estimates in 
Panel A.  Every FGLS point estimate of BRADY in Panel B of Table II is statistically 
significant.  The FGLS monthly point estimates of BRADY are smaller than those 
obtained using OLS, but they are still large.   The smallest point estimate for the twelve-
month window is 0.034— a total revaluation of greater than 40 percent.  Furthermore, the 
coefficient on BRADY remains significantly larger than the coefficient on CONTROL in 
all of the specifications except for some of those that use 3-month windows. 
 
IV.  Do IMF Programs and Economic Reforms Drive the Results?  
Three central facts emerge from Sections II and III: (1) Stock markets in debtor 
countries experience a positive and statistically significant revaluation in response to 
news of debt relief; (2) the effect is large and it is not an artifact of the currency in which 
the revaluation is measured; and (3) the response is uniformly positive across debtor 
countries. 
The control group also experiences a mild revaluation, but the 50-percentage-
point difference between the estimates of BRADY and CONTROL is statistically 
significant and cannot be explained by a common shock.  Having ruled out common 
shocks as an explanation, the following subsection of the paper examines whether the   15
Brady countries’ stock market revaluations are driven by the prospect of debt relief or the 
expectation of future IMF programs and economic reforms.  
 
IVA.  IMF Programs 
Countries receive debt relief in return for agreeing to commit to economic reforms 
that are designed to increase openness and raise productivity (Cline, 1995).  In other 
words, Brady agreements may also constitute implicit news about the entire future 
schedule of economic reforms.  Official country agreements with the International 
Monetary Fund illustrate the point.  Column 3 of Table III shows that an official 
agreement with the IMF immediately precedes, or follows on the heels of, every Brady 
deal. 
Since IMF programs followed all of the Brady agreements, Brady agreements 
may drive up stock prices because they signal future IMF agreements.  Because every 
debt relief agreement closely coincides with an IMF agreement, we cannot disentangle 
the debt relief effect by inserting into equation (3) a dummy variable for IMF programs 
that coincide with debt relief announcements.  An IMF dummy constructed in that way 
would be collinear with the BRADY dummy and present the attendant econometric 
problems. 
Therefore, we adopt a different tack.  We examine whether the stock market 
responds to IMF agreements that are not accompanied by debt relief.  We do this by 
constructing for each country a list of all IMF programs that did not occur within a year 
(before or after) of the announcement of its Brady debt relief agreement.  We then create   16
a dummy variable, IMFPROGRAM, which takes on the value one for all such programs, 
and estimate the following regression:  
1
W
it t it it R R IMFPROGRAM α βγ ε =+ + +                                                              (4) 
Following the earlier specifications, we estimate twelve-month, nine-month, six-month, 
and three-month windows.  If the stock market responds positively to IMF agreements 
that are not accompanied by debt relief, then the estimate of  1 γ  should be positive and 
significant.   
There is no evidence that the stock market responds positively to IMF agreements 
that are not associated with a Brady Debt Relief Agreement.  The coefficient estimate of 
IMFPROGRAM is negative and statistically insignificant in every specification.  The 
estimate for the twelve-month window is –0.016; the estimate for the nine-month window 
is -0.011; the estimate for the six-month window is -0.004; the estimate for the three-
month window is -0.027.
5 
 
IVB.  Economic Reforms 
Just as debt relief agreements may signal future IMF agreements, IMF agreements 
may in turn signal countries’ commitment to future economic reforms (Williamson, 1994; 
Collins, 1990; Bruno and Easterly, 1996).  By transitivity, debt relief may signal future 
economic reforms.  If debt relief agreements are a signal of future productivity-enhancing 
reforms, then the results in Table II may erroneously attribute the stock market 
revaluation to debt relief instead of the future reforms.   
                                                 
5 The insignificance of the IMFPROGRAM variable is consistent with evidence that the market responds 
positively to IMF agreements, only when they are announced in the midst of high inflation (Henry, 2002).   17
Columns 2 through 4 of Table III present a list of critical economic reform dates 
in each country.  Broadly speaking, economic reforms fall into one of four areas: 
stabilization, privatization, trade liberalization, and capital account liberalization.  The 
previous subsection on IMF programs addresses stabilization issues.  This subsection 
focuses on the latter three reforms. 
We use the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Quarterly Economic Reports to identify 
the date of trade liberalization.  We check the EIU dates against the trade liberalization 
dates in the World Bank Publication, Trends in Developing Economies (1994) and the 
dates in Sachs and Warner (1995).  We identify privatization dates with the World Bank 
Privatization Transaction Database, which contains the names and dollar amounts of all 
privatizations occurring between 1988 and 1999.  We use the database to identify the first 
year in which there were recorded sales of stated owned enterprises.  Once we know the 
year of the first sale, we search the EIU’s quarterly economic reports for the month in 
which the start of the privatization program was announced.  We also check the EIU to 
make sure that there were no privatizations preceding the starting date of the database.  
Finally, the capital account liberalization dates come from Henry (2000).   
A close examination of Table III illustrates the point of the exercise.  All of the 
treatment countries began implementing major economic reforms before, during and after 
the Brady period.  There is sufficient heterogeneity (staggering) in the timing of the 
economic reforms to allow us to control directly for their effect on stock prices.  To do 
so, we construct a series of reform dummies for each country: TRADE; PRIVATIZE; 
LIBERALIZE.  These variables take on the value 1 during the month a reform is   18




it i t it it it it it it R R BRADY CONTROL TRADE PRIVATE CAPITAL α βγ γ γ γ γ ε =+ + + + + + +
(5) 
Table IV presents the results.  Panel A gives the White-corrected OLS estimates.  
Panel B gives the FGLS estimates.  The coefficient on BRADY is significant at the 1 
percent or 5 percent level for every window.  The point estimate of 0.05 suggests an 
average revaluation of 5 percent per month during the debt relief announcement window.  
The third row of the table shows that the coefficient on BRADY is significantly different 
from the coefficient on CONTROL for all of the specifications.  Consistent with a 
number of previous papers, the capital account liberalization dummy is significant for the 
[-6, 0] and [-3, -1] windows.   There is little evidence that the other reforms do much to 
stock prices during the sample period.  Table IV suggests that the Brady Plan is an 
important source of market revaluation, even after controlling for the effect of 
contemporaneous economic reforms.   
 
IVC.  Is it a Halo Effect? 
Since we find no significant effect of real economic reforms, it is important to ask 
whether the documented rise in stock prices associated with the Brady Deal is spurious.  
In other words, is there a temporary halo effect associated with Brady countries, a kind of 
irrational exuberance about the efficacy of debt relief that is not justified by subsequent 
changes in the fundamentals?  Two pieces of evidence suggest that this is not the case.   
First, although the point estimates of the market responses to reforms are not 
significant, it does not follow that economic reforms are unimportant.  On the contrary,   19
economic reforms are an essential complement, which help ensure the viability of debt 
relief agreements.  Figure 3 illustrates the point.  In the three countries in which reforms 
stalled temporarily— Jordan, Nigeria, and the Philippines— the initial rise in valuations 
is completely wiped out.   In other words, debt relief does little good unless it is 
accompanied by real changes that alter a country’s underlying economic fundamentals. 
Second, ex-post evidence suggests that the stock market revaluations are not 
simply a halo effect.  Specifically, the next section of the paper demonstrates that the 
stock market accurately forecasts changes in real fundamental variables such as GDP 
growth and the Net Resource Transfers (NRT).  In particular, high GDP growth, and 
positive NRTs follow after all stock market revaluations. 
 
V.  Exploring the Fundamentals: Why Do Market Values Rise? 
If the stock market increases are not spurious, they should reflect a fall in future 
discount rates and or a rise in cash flows.  Accordingly, this section of the paper 
examines the extent to which the ex-ante changes in market valuation rationally forecast 
ex-post changes in discount rates and cash flows. 
The effect of debt relief on discount rates follows from the collective action 
problem that debt relief is designed to address.  To understand the collective action 
problem it is useful to introduce the idea of the net resource transfer (NRT).  The NRT is 
the net flow of real resources into a country, and therefore has direct implications for 
discount rates.
6 
                                                 
6 Discount rates in developing countries are notoriously hard to measure.  Financial repression and other 
market distortions, which characterized these countries prior to the Brady Plan, make it difficult to assess 
the true change in the risk-free rate from official interest rates.  Instead of looking at official interest rate 
measures, which may not reflect the true scarcity of capital, we use the change in the NRT as a proxy.     20
As rich countries with high capital to labor ratios will export capital to poor 
countries where the rate of return is higher, poor countries typically experience positive 
NRTs.  However, the NRT may suddenly turn negative when collective action problems 
arise— adverse shocks or poor economic management may drive risk averse creditors to 
call in existing loans and make potential new creditors unwilling to lend.  Since lending 
would be profitable if not all creditors tried to get their money at once, the negative NRT 
outcome is inefficient.  By forcing all creditors to take a haircut, debt relief solves the 
collective action problem and paves the way for profitable new lending (Cline, 1995).  
The new capital inflow reduces discount rates in the debtor country by relaxing the 
intertemporal budget constraint (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996).   
The effect of debt relief on cash flows also follows from the theory.  If a country 
suffers from a debt overhang, then debt relief may increase the incentive to invest and 
raise expected future growth rates (Krugman, 1989; Sachs, 1989).  To the extent that 
corporate cash flows are positively correlated with GDP, a higher GDP growth rate 
implies a faster growth trend for cash flows. 
 
VA.  Is There a Change in Net Resource Transfers? 
Since debt relief may reduce discount rates by restoring positive net resource 
transfers to countries where it hat turned negative, the large positive ex-ante changes in 
market valuation should be associated with positive changes in the NRT.  Panel A of 
Table V presents data on the Net Resource Transfer in event time.  The table shows a 
clear pattern.  The sign of the NRT changes twice for the Brady countries.  In every one 
of the years from [-18, -9] the median net resource transfer is positive for the Brady   21
countries.  In year –8, roughly the time of the debt crisis, the NRT turns negative and 
remains so until after the Brady Plan.  After the Brady Plan, net resource flows become 
positive for the rest of the sample. 
Again, it is important to ask whether the reversal in the sign of the NRT in the 
Brady countries can be explained by a common shock.  The evidence from the control 
group in Panel B of Table V suggests that this is not the case.  The median level of NRT 
to the countries in the control group was positive for all but two years from 1970 to 2000. 
Panel B of Table V shows that the reversal in the direction of the net resource 
transfer is particularly striking for some individual Brady countries.  In Brazil, for 
instance, after 10 consecutive years of negative resource transfers, the NRT turns positive 
in the year of the announcement of the Brady plan and remains positive for the rest of the 
sample.  In 5 of 10 Brady countries with stock market data --Brazil, Jordan, Mexico, 
Philippines, and Venezuela –the NRT becomes positive within the first year of the Brady 
plan
7.  In Argentina and Ecuador, the NRT turned positive in the year preceding the plan.  
In Poland, the NRT turned positive in 1991, admittedly long before its debt relief plan 
was unveiled.  However, following Poland’s plan, there was a three-fold increase in the 
level of NRT.  In fact, Peru is the only country from this group, which did not experience 
a change in NRT concomitant with its Brady plan.  Peru is also the only country in the 
group, which did not experience a positive and significant stock market revaluation in 
anticipation of the plan. 
The numbers in Panel B also demonstrate that debt relief without economic 
reform has only ephemeral success in restoring positive NRTs.  After initially turning 
positive, the NRT becomes negative in 3 out of the 10 Brady countries with stock 
                                                 
7 In Nigeria, the NRT turned positive two years after the Brady plan.   22
markets: Nigeria, Philippines, and Venezuela.  The last paragraph of Section IVB 
identifies Nigeria and the Philippines as non-reformers at the time of their Brady Plan.  
And Venezuela, according to Sachs and Warner (1995) significantly reversed its reforms 
after two years of successful implementation.   
On the other hand, economic reform without debt relief is not sufficient to restore 
positive NRTs.  We checked to see whether the NRT to Brady countries became positive 
following the economic reform dates in Table III.  None of these reforms by themselves 
are successful in reversing the sign of the NRT.  Only after the implementation of debt 
relief does the NRT turn positive.  Again, this fact should not be interpreted to mean that 
economic reforms are unimportant.  Indeed, the NRT remains positive only as long as 
countries sustain their economic reforms.  Here is the point: While economic reforms are 
important for raising the productivity of capital, reforms by themselves may not be 
sufficient to overcome collective action problems.   
Turning to Panel B, we see that Brady countries without stock markets do not 
systematically experience the reversal in the NRT that we see in the Brady stock market 
countries.  The median NRT for the non-stock market Brady countries turned negative 
only once between [-18, 0].  Although Panama and Uruguay have certainly experienced 
changes in the NRT following their Brady Plans, it is harder to make that assessment for 
the other countries.  The net resource transfers to Bolivia, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, and the 
Dominican Republic have almost always been positive, even during the debt crisis years.   
This pattern may suggest that debt relief for these poorer countries was not as 
effective as it was for the other countries for which dependable stock markets data were   23
available.  Section VI explores why this may be the case, but before doing so we now 
examine whether debt relief is associated with changes in growth. 
 
VB.  Is There a Change in Growth? 
Since debt relief may increase expected future growth rates, positive ex-ante 
changes in market valuation should be associated with higher than normal future GDP 
growth.  Figure 4 shows that countries grow faster following the Brady Plan.  The graph 
plots the average deviation of the growth rate of per capita GDP from its country-specific 
mean in event time for all 16 Brady countries versus that of the control group.  The 
message is clear.  The Brady countries experience abnormally high growth rates in each 
of the five years following the Brady plan.  There is no significant change in the growth 
rates of the control group. 
 
VC.  Does the Stock Market Rationally Forecast the Changes? 
Table VI shows that the stock market revaluations appear to rationally forecast 
higher future NRTs.  There is a strong correlation between the sign of the cumulative 
abnormal return on the stock market and the change in the sign of the NRT.  In 9 of 10 
countries, stock markets correctly predict the change in the sign of the NRT within the 
two years following the Brady Plan.   
Next, Table VI shows that the stock market revaluations, which occur in 
anticipation of the Brady Plan, also appear to forecast higher future GDP growth 
outcomes.  There is a strong correlation between the sign of the cumulative abnormal 
return on the stock market and the sign of the deviations of output growth from its long-  24
run mean.  In 9 of 10 countries, markets predicted the abnormal GDP growth in the year 
following the Brady Plan.  In 9 of 10 countries, the markets predicted the positive 
cumulative abnormal GDP growth for the next two years, and similarly in 8 of the 10 
countries for the next five years after the Brady Plan.   
 
VI.  Do the Results Suggest that the HIPC Initiative Will Work? 
Easterly (2001b) argues that debt relief is unlikely to promote investment, reform 
or growth in the HIPCs.  We think that he is right.  Yes, markets rise in anticipation of the 
Brady Plan.  And ex-post data on net resource transfers and growth confirm the 
rationality of the markets’ forecast.  But there are vast differences between the Brady 
countries and the HIPCs. 
Theory suggests that in order for a country to be a legitimate candidate for debt 
relief, it must satisfy two necessary (but not sufficient) conditions.  First, the collective 
action problem must stand in the way of net capital inflows to that country.  Second, the 
country must have a social infrastructure that is sufficiently well developed to ensure that 
net capital inflows will be channeled into growth-generating investment.   
The data in Sections I through V suggest that the Brady countries meet both 
necessary conditions.  In contrast, this section argues that the HIPC countries do not 
satisfy either.  Specifically we demonstrate that: (1) Capital flows to the HIPC countries 
are not deterred by the collective action problem; (2) There has never been significant 
scope for profitable lending to the HIPC countries; and (3) The absence of profitable 
investment opportunities stems from a lack of social infrastructure. 
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VIA.  The Collective Action Problem Does Not Deter Capital Flows to the HIPCs 
The Brady Plan worked because it alleviated the collective action problem, 
clearing the way for renewed and profitable lending to the Brady countries.  In contrast, 
HIPC countries have never suffered from a negative NRT.  Panel A of Table V (column 
5) shows that the NRT to the HIPC countries has always been positive.  If the goal of 
debt relief is to restore positive NRTs, then it is not clear how this policy will help a set 
of countries that have experienced an uninterrupted stream of positive net resource flows 
since 1971.  
 
VIB.  There is Little Scope for Profitable Lending to the HIPC Countries 
Although things went sour in 1982, international lenders had expected to make 
money by lending to the Brady countries.  Presumably, this is why they did so in the first 
place.  In contrast, there has never been any such expectation for the HIPCs.  Table VII 
throws the contrast into relief.  As early as 1974, loans to the private sector (private debt 
+ foreign direct investment + portfolio equity) comprised almost half of the total net 
resource flow to the Brady stock market countries.  On the other hand, international 
lending to the private sector has never been a significant fraction of the total net resource 
flows into HIPC countries.  As a fraction of total inflows, loans to the private sector in 
the HIPC countries have never exceeded 10 percent and have been as low as 4 percent
8.   
Furthermore, there has also been a shift in the composition of international 
lending to the Brady countries, away from the public sector and toward the private sector.  
Table VII shows that at the peak of the debt crisis (1985-89) grants plus public and 
publicly guaranteed debt accounted for 73 percent of the net resource transfer to the 
                                                 
8 Table VIII provides a complete list of all the HIPC countries.   26
Brady countries.  By 1994, lending to the private sector— foreign direct investment 
(FDI), portfolio equity, and private debt— constituted the chief source of net resource 
flows.  No such shift has taken place in the HIPC countries.  In fact, the opposite has 
occurred—official flows and flows to the public sector have become more, not less, 
important.  The role of grants has increased to the point where they now constitute the 
majority of the net resource flows to the HIPC countries. 
 
VIC.  Poor Social Infrastructure Explains the Absence of Profitable Investment  
Recent advances in law and finance help explain the virtual absence of private 
capital flows to the HIPCs.  The degree to which a country’s law protects the legal rights 
of minority shareholders exerts a significant influence on that country’s access to external 
finance, (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) 1997, 1998, 2002; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  If investors get poor protection they will stay away.  Outside 
finance will dry up, and fewer resources will be available for growth (Dornbusch, 2000).  
This insight is germane to the present discussion.  The median Brady country ranks lower 
than the median G7 country on every component of the LLSV index of investor 
protection: shareholder rights, creditor rights, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, 
and rating of the accounting system.   
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) show that weaker investor protection lowers the 
marginal product of capital and can eliminate the incentive for capital to flow from rich 
to poor countries.  According to their argument, the capital, which does flow to the Brady 
countries, pales in comparison to what we would see in a world where minority   27
shareholders in the Brady countries enjoyed the same legal protection as their U.S. 
counterparts. 
While the Brady countries rank low on the LLSV index, the HIPC countries do 
not even make the list.  If private capital trickles to Brady countries because they fare 
poorly on the LLSV index, then woe to the HIPCs whose capital markets and investor 
protection laws are not sufficiently developed to even merit a ranking.  
Having capital markets that are not sufficiently developed to make the LLSV 
ranking is probably correlated with having weak social institutions in general.  In turn, 
social infrastructure can be a crucial factor in determining the level of human capital 
accumulation and the marginal product of capital (Kremer 1993).  In other words, the rate 
of return to private lending in HIPC countries is low because they lack the institutional 
development that is necessary to create an environment where: (1) entrepreneurs can earn 
an economically fair rate of return on capital; and (2) lenders have an incentive to extend 
capital to the private sector.   
We investigate this claim by using the Hall and Jones (1999) measure of social 
infrastructure to compare the HIPC and Brady countries.  Hall and Jones construct their 
measure for 130 countries.  The median G7 country ranks 14
th; the median Brady country 
ranks 63
rd; the median HIPC country ranks 102
nd.  Moreover, all of the G7 countries are 
in the highest 20
th percentile; all of the Brady countries, except for Nigeria and 
Dominican Republic, are in the highest 70
th percentile; 27 of the 38 HIPC countries with 
available data are in the lowest 30
th percentile. 
We also compared HIPC and Brady countries using the average value of their 
score on the Heritage House Index of Economic Freedom from 1995 to 2002.  The results   28
are similar.  Out of 161 countries, the median G7 country ranks 14
th; the median Brady 
country ranks 59
th; the median HIPC country ranks 110
th.  Moreover, all of the G7 
countries are in the highest 20
th percentile; all the Brady countries, except for Bulgaria, 
are in the highest 60
th percentile; 24 of 39 HIPC countries with available data are in the 
lowest 40
th percentile over the same period. 
It is interesting to note that a number of highly or moderately indebted countries 
closely resemble the Brady countries, but have received no consideration for debt relief.  
For example, consider Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, Jamaica, Malaysia, and Turkey.  
The median LLSV score for this group of six countries is 4.6 out of 10.  The median 
LLSV score for the Brady countries is 4.9.  Similarly, the median country in the group of 
6 ranks 61
st on the Hall and Jones (1999) measure of social infrastructure; the median 
Brady country ranks 63
rd.  Finally, the median country in the group of six ranks 58
th on 
the Heritage House Index of Economic Freedom; the Median Brady country ranks 59
th. 
While we do not suggest that countries should receive debt relief based solely on their 
resemblance to Brady countries, the analysis suggests that debt relief for the group of six 
would constitute a much more efficient use of resources than debt relief for the HIPCs. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
Largely because of the HIPC Initiative, debt relief has become synonymous with 
the poorest of poor countries.  Developing countries that are equally indebted but have 
higher incomes do not receive any consideration for debt relief.  For example, Easterly 
(2001b) shows that Latin American and Caribbean countries are on average more 
indebted than HIPC countries.  Birdsall and Williamson (2002) call for extending the 
debt relief initiative to include a number of more developed emerging economies.  Our   29
results support their call and point to a cruel irony.  Relatively developed but highly 
indebted emerging economies may be the most promising candidates for debt relief, but 
current efforts focus exclusively on HIPC countries where debt relief is least likely to 
achieve any efficiency gains.   30
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Figure 1.  Stock prices rise in anticipation of debt relief.  The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage change.  0 is the 
month in which the debt relief plan was announced.  The solid line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 10 
Brady countries with stock market data available on a constant and 9 country-specific dummies.  The dashed line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a 
panel regression of the real dollar return from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies. 
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Figure 2.  Stock prices rise in anticipation of debt relief.  The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage change.  0 is the 
month in which the debt relief plan was announced.  The series in bold color is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real local 
currency return from 10 Brady countries with stock market data available on a constant and 9 country-specific dummies.  The series in light color is a plot of the 
cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real local currency return from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies. 
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Figure 3.  The stock market and Brady reformers versus non-reformers.  The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage 
change.  0 is the month in which the debt relief plan was announced.  The series in bold color is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the 
real dollar return from 7 reformer Brady countries with stock market data available (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Poland, and Venezuela) on a 
constant and 6 country-specific dummies.  The series in light color is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 3 
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Figure 4.  GDP growth increases following debt relief.  The variable on the y-axis is the abnormal percentage deviation from the trend growth rate.  0 is the 
year in which the debt relief plan was announced.  The series in bold color is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the real GDP growth rate from all 
16 Brady countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies.  The series in light color is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the real GDP 
growth rate from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies.  
Table I.  Universe of Countries in the Sample 
 









Stock Market Data 
Available? 
Argentina: April 1992  Yes  Chile  Yes 
      
Brazil: August 1992  Yes  China  Yes 
      
Ecuador: May 1994  Yes  Colombia  Yes 
      
Jordan: June 1993  Yes  Czech Republic  Yes 
      
Mexico: September 1989  Yes  Greece  Yes 
      
Nigeria: March 1991  Yes  Hungary  Yes 
      
Peru: October 1995  Yes  India  Yes 
      
Philippines: August 1989  Yes  Indonesia  Yes 
      
Poland: March 1994  Yes  Korea  Yes 
      
Venezuela: June 1990  Yes  Malaysia  Yes 
      
Bolivia: March 1993  No  Pakistan  Yes 
      
Bulgaria: November 1993  No  South Africa  Yes 
      
Costa Rica: November 1989  No  Sri Lanka  Yes 
      
Dominican Republic: May 1993  No  Thailand  Yes 
      
Panama: May 1995  No  Turkey  Yes 
      




    
Median growth  0.01 
(0.02) 
Median growth  0.03 
(0.01) 









The first column lists all the countries in the Treatment group, i.e., the countries that signed Brady deals.  The next column 
identifies the countries for which stock market data are available from the IFC Emerging Market Data Base or the Global 
Financial Data Base.  In contrast, the last two columns list all the countries in the Control group, i.e. the countries that did not 
sign Brady deals and have had stock market data available as of 1994 from the IFC Emerging Market Data Base.  The last two 
rows compare the Treatment and Control groups in terms of their historical GDP per capita growth and inflation rates from 
1980 to 1999. The standard deviation of each rate is given in parenthesis. 
  
 
Table II.  Brady Countries Experience a Significant Increase in Market Valuation Before Debt Relief Announcements.  The Control 
Countries Do Not.  Panel A: White-Corrected OLS Estimates 












































































0.011   .048*** 
(.016) 
    .014*** 
   (.005) 





































0.023   .045*** 
(.016) 
    .014*** 
   (.005) 















0.018   .043*** 
(.016) 
    .014*** 
   (.005) 













































The estimation procedure used is Ordinary Least Squares.  The stock market data are monthly from December 1979 to July 1999 for all the countries in the Treatment and 
Control groups.  Stock market data are unavailable before December 1984 for Nigeria, Philippines, Venezuela, Columbia, Malaysia, Pakistan; before December 1986 for 
Turkey; before December 1989 for Indonesia; before December 1992 for Peru, Poland, China, Hungary, South Africa, Sri Lanka; before September 1993 for Ecuador; and 
before December 1993 for the Czech Republic.  The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  Brady is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for 
each month during a particular event window preceding a Brady plan.  Control is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for each country in the control group during the 
months preceding Brady Plans.  The column labeled ‘Twelve-month Window’ presents estimates of Brady and Control using an event window that begins twelve months prior 
to the announcement of the Brady Plan and ends with the announcement month.  The analogous definition applies to the columns labeled ‘Nine-month Window,’ ‘Six-Month 
Window’ and ‘Three-Month Window.’  For each event window, six regression specifications are estimated.  The first row presents estimates of Brady and Control using the 
benchmark specification that allows for country-specific intercept terms.  Row 2 presents estimates using an alternative specification that allows for only a single intercept 
term.  Row 3 presents estimates using the ICAPM specification that introduces the World stock return index as an additional explanatory variable.  Row 4 presents estimates 
using the US stock return index instead of the World stock index.  Row 5 presents estimates using the LDC stock return index instead.  Finally, row 6 presents estimates that 
use all three sets of indices simultaneously.  The column labeled Brady>Control shows the p-value for a test that the coefficient on Brady is statistically larger than the 
coefficient on Control.  White-corrected standard errors are given in parenthesis.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively.    40
 
 
Table II.  Brady Countries Experience a Significant Increase in Market Valuation Before Debt Relief Announcements.  The Control 


























































































0.01      .040* 
(.019) 
   .014** 
(.006) 
0.20 




  .038*** 
 (.010) 
   .008* 
(.004) 








0.01     .039** 
(.019) 










0.015   .039*** 
(.013) 
    .009* 
(.005) 




0.04     .042** 
(.022) 


















0.03     .042** 
(.022) 






  .034*** 
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(.005) 















  .034*** 
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  -.005 
(.005) 













The estimation procedure is Feasible Generalized Least Squares.  The stock market data are monthly from December 1979 to July 1999 for all the countries in the Treatment and 
Control groups.  Stock market data are unavailable before December 1984 for Nigeria, Philippines, Venezuela, Columbia, Malaysia, Pakistan; before December 1986 for Turkey; 
before December 1989 for Indonesia; before December 1992 for Peru, Poland, China, Hungary, South Africa, Sri Lanka; before September 1993 for Ecuador; and before 
December 1993 for the Czech Republic.  The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  Brady is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for each 
month during a particular event window preceding a Brady plan.  Control is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for each country in the control group during the months 
preceding Brady Plans.  The column labeled ‘Twelve-month Window’ presents estimates of Brady and Control using an event window that begins twelve months prior to the 
announcement of the Brady Plan and ends with the announcement month.  The analogous definition applies to the columns labeled ‘Nine-month Window,’ ‘Six-Month Window’ 
and ‘Three-Month Window.’  For each event window, six regression specifications are estimated.  The first row presents estimates of Brady and Control using the benchmark 
specification that allows for country-specific intercept terms.  Row 2 presents estimates using an alternative specification that allows for only a single intercept term.  Row 3 
presents estimates using the ICAPM specification that introduces the World stock return index as an additional explanatory variable.  Row 4 presents estimates using the US stock 
return index instead of the World stock index.  Row 5 presents estimates using the LDC stock return index instead.  Finally, row 6 presents estimates that use all three sets of 
indices simultaneously.  The column labeled Brady>Control shows the p-value for a test that the coefficient on Brady is statistically larger than the coefficient on Control.  
Standard errors are given in parenthesis.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.     41
 
 





















March 1993    1985  1992  NA 




November 1993  NA  NA  1991  NA 
 





May 1993  NA  Closed  1999  NA 
Ecuador  May 1994  May 1994  January 1991  February 1993  January 1993 
 
Jordan  June 1993  May 1994 (EFF)  1965  January 1995  January 1978 
 
Mexico  September 1989  May 1989 (EFF)  July 1986  November 1988  May 1989 
 
Nigeria  March 1991  January 1991 (SB)  Closed  July 1988  Closed 
 
Panama May  1995    NA  1990  NA 
 
Peru  October 1995  March 1993 (EFF)  March 1991  March 1991  NA (Open Before 95) 
Investibility index 
 
Philippines  August 1989  May 1989 (EFF)   November 1988  June 1988  May 1986 
 
Poland  March 1994  August 1994 (SB)  1990  1990*  1990 
 
Uruguay November  1990    1990  1990  NA 
 
Venezuela  June 1990  June 1989 (EFF)  May 1989**  April 1991  January 1990 
This table lists the announcement dates of major economic events for the countries in the Treatment group. The first column identifies these countries.  The second 
column lists the month and year of each country’s Brady Plan.  These dates are obtained from Cline (1995), Lexis/Nexis, and various issues of the Economist Intelligence 
Unit.  The third column lists IMF plans that are announced shortly preceding or following Brady Plans. These dates are obtained from Henry (2002) and various issues of 
the IMF Annual Reports.  A Standby agreement with the IMF is noted as SB and an Extended Fund Facility agreement is noted as EFF.  The next three columns list the 
dates of the beginnings of major economic reforms.  The trade liberalization dates are obtained from Sachs and Werner (1995).  The privatization dates are obtained from 
the Privatization Data Base maintained by the World Bank.  The capital account liberalization dates are obtained from Henry (2000).  *Poland switched to a market 
economy in 1990, simultaneously setting up a stock market and opening up to foreign investment.  **Venezuela reversed its trade liberalization reforms in 1993.   42
 
 
Table IV, After Controlling for Other Reforms, Brady Countries Experience a Significant Increase in Market Valuation Before Debt 





























Brady        .048*** 
(.012) 
 
     .049*** 
(.013) 
     .047*** 
(.016) 
   .054** 
(.023) 
       .048*** 
(.012) 
      .048*** 
(.013) 
     .046*** 
(.015) 









































Trade          -.013 
(.016) 
      -.004 
(.018) 
    -.006 
(.022) 
 
      -.052 
(.033) 
          -.011 
(.016) 
      -.001 
(.018) 
    -.002 
(.021) 







    .051** 
(.021) 






     .057*** 
(.021) 
      .101*** 
(.032) 
The estimation procedure is Ordinary Least Squares; White-corrected standard errors are given in parenthesis.  The stock market data are monthly from December 1979 to 
July 1999 for all the countries in the Treatment and Control groups.  Stock market data are unavailable before December 1984 for Nigeria, Philippines, Venezuela, Columbia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan; before December 1986 for Turkey; before December 1989 for Indonesia; before December 1992 for Peru, Poland, China, Hungary, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka; before September 1993 for Ecuador; and before December 1993 for the Czech Republic.  The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  Brady 
is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for each month during a particular event window preceding a Brady plan.  Four different event windows are utilized.  The 
column labeled ‘Twelve-month Window’ presents estimates of Brady and Control using an event window that begins twelve months prior to the announcement of the Brady 
Plan and ends with the announcement month.  The analogous definition applies to the columns labeled ‘Nine-month Window,’ ‘Six-Month Window’ and ‘Three-Month 
Window.’  Control is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for each country in the control group during the months preceding Brady Plans.  Privatize, Trade, and 
Liberalize are dummy variables that take on the value one during the event window preceding a privatization, trade liberalization and stock market liberalization respectively.  
For each event window, two regression specifications are estimated.  The World column presents estimates of Brady, Control, Privatize, Trade, and Liberalize using the 
ICAPM specification that introduces the World stock return index as an additional explanatory variable.  The Constant Mean column presents estimates using the 
specification that allows for only a single intercept term.  The column labeled Brady>Control shows the p-value for a test that the coefficient on Brady is statistically larger 
than the coefficient on Control.  .  The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   43
 
 
Table IV.  After Controlling for Other Reforms, Brady Countries Experience a Significant Increase in Market Valuation Before Debt 






























Brady       .033*** 
(.011) 
     .039*** 
(.012) 
     .046*** 
(.014) 
   .045** 
(.021) 
       .037*** 
(.010) 
     .042*** 
(.011) 
     .048*** 
(.013) 
   .039** 
(.019) 
 
Control          .004 
(.004) 
   .009** 
(.004) 
      .0127*** 
(.004) 
   .012** 
(.006) 
    .008* 
(.004) 
     .012*** 
(.004) 
     .015*** 
(.005) 






0.012 0.014  0.022  0.130  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.206 
Privatize          -.001 
(.012) 






         -.002 
(.012) 







Trade          -.011 
(.020) 
      -.001 
(.022) 
      -.005 
(.026) 
     -.068* 
(.039) 























      .049* 
(.027) 
       .089** 
(.040) 
The estimation procedure used is Feasible Generalized Least Squares.  .  The stock market data are monthly from December 1979 to July 1999 for all the countries in the 
Treatment and Control groups.  Stock market data are unavailable before December 1984 for Nigeria, Philippines, Venezuela, Columbia, Malaysia, Pakistan; before 
December 1986 for Turkey; before December 1989 for Indonesia; before December 1992 for Peru, Poland, China, Hungary, South Africa, Sri Lanka; before September 
1993 for Ecuador; and before December 1993 for the Czech Republic.  The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  Brady is a dummy variable 
that takes on the value one for each month during a particular event window preceding a Brady plan.  Four different event windows are utilized.  The column labeled 
‘Twelve-month Window’ presents estimates of Brady and Control using an event window that begins twelve months prior to the announcement of the Brady Plan and 
ends with the announcement month.  The analogous definition applies to the columns labeled ‘Nine-month Window,’ ‘Six-Month Window’ and ‘Three-Month Window.’  
Control is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for each country in the control group during the months preceding Brady Plans.  Privatize, Trade, and Liberalize 
are dummy variables that take on the value one during the event window preceding a privatization, trade liberalization and stock market liberalization respectively.  For 
each event window, two regression specifications are estimated.  The World column presents estimates of Brady, Control, Privatize, Trade, and Liberalize using the 
ICAPM specification that introduces the World stock return index as an additional explanatory variable.  The Constant Mean column presents estimates using the 
specification that allows for only a single intercept term.  The column labeled Brady>Control shows the p-value for a test that the coefficient on Brady is statistically 
larger than the coefficient on Control.  .  The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table V.  The Brady Plan Reverses the Sign of the Net Resource Transfer (Millions of US$) in the Brady Stock Market 
Countries. Panel A: Group Medians 
Year in Event 
Time 
 Brady  Stock 
Market Countries 
 Control  Group 
 
 Brady  Non-Stock 
Market Countries 
 Highly-Indebted 
Poor Countries  
-18  87  91  58  13 
             
-17  10   143   69  19 
             
-16  123  116  142   25 
             
-15  382  104   87    25 
             
-14  285  124   27    61 
             
-13  495  220  152   65 
             
-12   1371   100    129    53 
             
-11   1063   347    155    78 
             
-10  847  505   54   103 
             
-9   297  648  237  151 
             
-8   -43  594  100  134 
             
-7   146  403  103  119 
             
-6   -419    330   78   123 
             
-5   -1679    529   87   119 
             
-4   -833    189   37   118 
             
-3   -228   84   -40    117 
             
-2    -767   -71  49  143 
             
-1    -578   -10  80  171 
           
0   -283    187    58    202 
             
1   -54  366  -46  223 
             
2   2372   998    188    252 
             
3   1216  1173   48    259 
             
4   1124  2675   197    262 
             
5   2267  2197   407    229 
Net resource transfers are equal to net resource flows minus interest payments on long-term loans and foreign direct investment profits.  The first column 
lists the years in event time.  The number ‘0’ represents the year in which its Brady Plan was announced.  For Control group countries and Highly-Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC), 0 represents 1989.  The next four columns show the progression of net resource transfers in event time to the following groups of 
countries: the Control group, the Brady Stock market group, the Brady Non-Stock market group, and the HIPC countries.  The Control group countries are 
displayed in Table I.  The Brady Stock market countries are the countries in the Treatment group with available stock market data as displayed in Table I.  
The Brady Non-Stock market countries are the remaining countries of the Treatment group.  The HIPC countries are displayed in Table VIII. The data on 
NRT are obtained from World Bank’s Global Development Finance Data Base.   45
 
 























-18  -86  5586 10  466 100 -725 211  -42 NA -535 
              
-17 -568  3968  484  471  132  -519  -328  123  NA  -1036 
              
-16  613  4618 382  490 1188 -468 -406  -20  NA -1760 
              
-15  -358  4572 285  547 1747 -640 -580  295  NA -527 
              
-14 495  6869  349  1342  2418  -411  -479  510  NA  -428 
              
-13  3372 1858 704 1348  3112  1303 712  986 2346  1393 
              
-12  1593  -844 -905 1272  3285 830  854  807 1500  1442 
              
-11 4436  1867  -432  1055  2433  -1354  440  639  213  2700 
              
-10 3231  -410  -207  997  1136  758  -84  547  -546  47 
              
-9  -1197 -3614  -399 777 3043  1445 167  489 -324 -253 
              
-8 -3454  -1074  28  687  7490  700  263  729  -317  -1475 
              
-7  -1330 -6550  85  867  542 -1426 153  561 -1437 -923 
              
-6  -2971 -7100 -63  745 -5658  -2290 203  865 -1067  -2550 
              
-5  -2629  -7066 18  496  -8666  -514 243  72 -1152  -2486 
              
-4  -1729  -7229  -251 808  -9452 95  -206  224 -202  -3856 
              
-3  -1412 -8948 -354  853 -6443  -1180 228  -263 2753  -4276 
              
-2 -2571  -3952  -377  410  -1485  1414  2155  -779  1163  -3483 
              
-1  528  -496  231  -70  -7443 -1799 4460  -655  2180 -1927 
              
0  2917  5026  67  -222 -7553 -1473 3723  -175  2176 -2283 
              
1  11975 10913 144  39  5364 -2277 3946  51  6437  797 
              
2  7794 3469 278  333 4798 351 2080  -272 4804 206 
              
3  6122 7217 555  70  1699 631 1618  -844 6169  -1280 
4  13205 18474 -169  610 13114 -372  2160  2374 7943 -1836 
              
5  12793 24250 156  208 11235 -691  550  2293 8317 -1811 
The net resource transfer (NRT) to individual Brady Stock market countries in event time.  The Brady Stock market countries are the countries in the Treatment 
group with available stock market data as displayed in Table V, Panel A.  The data on NRT are obtained from World Bank’s Global Development Finance Data 
Base.   46
 
 
Table V.  The Net Resource Transfer (Millions of US$).  Panel C: Individual Non-Stock Market Brady Countries  












-18  167  NA   42    58    168    11 
                  
-17  213  NA   45    69    417    -14 
                  
-16  300  NA   58   142    41    213 
                  
-15  214  NA   87    88   -174   -19 
                  
-14  151  NA  163   27   -140   21 
                  
-13  214  NA  152  267    119    66 
                  
-12  147  350  244   111    -59    99 
                  
-11   44   495  152   157   -126   390 
                  
-10  -112  374  110   -1   -269   395 
                  
-9   -94  740  234   240   -349   254 
                  
-8   -166  746  137   161   -224   63 
                  
-7    244   1277   49    -21    -42    156 
                  
-6    223   1026  -131   92    63    -254 
                  
-5   186  364   10    95    80   -264 
                  
-4   270  245   41    34    -44   -113 
                  
-3   199    -434    -76   64  -167   -5 
                  
-2   614  144   97    -35    1   -252 
                  
-1   492  100   61    -51    236   -165 
                  
0   349    108    36    -32    79    -396 
                  
1   454    441    -21    -129    -71    -164 
                  
2   853  -64  105   271   1509   103 
                  
3   912  -68  -90  -108  1320   165 
                  
4    1212   147  -104   163    852    232 
                  
5    1196   331   0    608    482    65 
The net resource transfer (NRT) to Brady Non-Stock market countries in event time.  The Brady Non-Stock market countries are the countries 
in the Treatment group without available stock market data as displayed in Table V, Panel; B.  The data on the NRT are obtained from the 
World Bank’s Global Development Finance Data Base.   47
 
 
Table VI.  The Stock Market Forecasts Future Changes in the Net Resource Transfer and GDP Growth 



























Year [0, +5] 
Argentina  +  + + + + + + 
 
Brazil  +  +  - + + + + 
 
Ecuador  +  + + + + + - 
 
Jordan  +  +  - + + + + 
 
Mexico  +  + + + + + + 
 
Nigeria  +  + + + + + + 
 
Peru -  No  change 
in sign 
 
+ + + + + 
Philippines  +  + + + - + + 
 
Poland +  No  change 
in sign* 
 
+ + + + + 
Venezuela +  + + + + + + 
 
This table presents the correlation between increases in market valuation before Brady Plan announcements and changes in net resource transfers and 
GDP growth afterwards.  The first column lists the Brady Stock market countries. The Brady Stock market countries are the countries in the Treatment 
group with available stock market data as displayed in Table I.  The second column identifies the countries that experienced abnormal stock market 
returns over the 12 months preceding their Brady Plan announcements.  The third column identifies the countries that experienced changes from 
negative NRT to positive NRT in the year preceding or during the two years following the announcement.  The fourth column identifies the countries 
that experienced abnormal GDP growth in the year of the announcement.  The fifth and sixth columns identify those that experienced abnormal 
growth in the first and second year after the announcement.  Finally, the seventh and eight columns identify the countries that experienced abnormal 
cumulative GDP growth during the two and five years following the announcement of the Brady Plan.  The + sign denotes positive identification of a 
country.  * Following the Brady Plan in Poland there is no change in the sign of NRT, but the level of NRT almost triples.   
.  48
 
Table VII.  The Composition of Net Resource Flows into HIPC, Brady, and Control Group Countries: 1970-1994. 





















HIPC                
Net  Resource  Flows  61  100.0 172 100.0 269  100.0  305  100.0  412  100.0 
                 
Public  Debt  39  64.6 111 64.5 176  65.4  158  51.9  120  29.2 
                 
Private  Debt  3 4.2 3 1.8 5  1.9  -1  -0.3  0  -0.1 
                 
FDI  4  5.9 12 7.0 11  4.0  14  4.4  50  12.2 
                 
PortfolioEquity  0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0  0  0.0  5  1.1 
                 
Grants  15 25.2 46 26.7 77  28.7  134  44.0  237  57.6 
                
Brady                
Net  Resource  Flows  530  100.0 1562 100.0 1938  100.0 722 100.0  2645  100.0 
                 
Public  Debt  264  49.8 1045 66.9 1346  69.4 443 61.4 309 11.7 
                 
Private  Debt  133 25.1 219 14.0 212  11.0  -177  -24.5  466  17.6 
                 
FDI  116 21.9 253 16.2 305  15.7  365  50.6  982  37.1 
                 
Portfolio  Equity 0 0.0 0 0.0 2  0.1  6  0.9  708  26.8 
                 
Grants  17 3.3 46 2.9 74  3.8  83  11.6  180  6.8 
                
Control Group                
Net  Resource  Flows  356  100.0  825  100.0  1612 100.0 1693 100.0 4853 100.0 
                 
Public  Debt  242  67.9  556  67.3  1055 65.4 1012 59.8 1278 26.3 
                 
Private  Debt  42  11.8 104 12.6 236  14.6 62  3.7 736  15.2 
                 
FDI 35  9.9  91  11.0  206  12.8  443  26.2  1981  40.8 
                 
Portfolio  Equity 0 0.0 0 0.0 3  0.2  47  2.8  665  13.7 
                 
Grants  37 10.4 75  9.0 113  7.0  129  7.6  193  4.0 
This table presents data on the composition of net resource flows for different groups of countries from 1970 to 2000.  The first column lists the components of net 
resource flows.  Net resource flows are the sum of net resource flows on public debt, private debt, foreign direct investment, portfolio equity, and official grants.  
The following columns display the data as averaged over intervals of five years.  The HIPC countries are displayed in Table VIII.  The Brady and Control group 
countries are displayed in Table I.  The data on net resource flows and its components are obtained from World Bank’s Global Development Finance Data Base.   49
                       
 
Table VIII.  The Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) 
     
Angola 
 
Cote d'Ivoire  Madagascar  Sierra Leone 
Benin 
 
Ethiopia Malawi  Somalia 
Bolivia 
 
The Gambia  Mali  Sudan 
Burkina Faso 
 
Ghana Mauritania  Tanzania 
Burundi 
 
Guinea Mozambique  Togo 
Cameroon 
 




Guyana Nicaragua  Vietnam 
Chad 
 
Honduras Niger  Yemen 
Comoros 
 
Kenya Rwanda  Zambia 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
 
Lao PDR  Sao Tome and Principe   
Republic of Congo  Liberia Senegal   
                             Groupings of HIPCs under the enhanced HIPC Initiative: Status as of September 2002.  Source:  
                              http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/progress-to-date/HIPC_Grouping_Sept02.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 